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Abstract
In this paper, we employ recently completed “poverty maps” for three countries as tools for an ex ante
evaluation of the distributional incidence of geographic targeting of public resources. We simulate the
impact on poverty of transferring an exogenously given budget to geographically defined sub-groups of the
population according to their relative poverty status. We find large gains from targeting smaller
administrative units, such as districts or villages. However, these gains are still far from the poverty
reduction that would be possible had the planners had access to information on household level income or
consumption. Our results indicate that a useful way forward might be to combine fine geographic targeting
using a poverty map with within-community targeting mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Public policies in developing countries are often articulated in terms of poverty reduction
objectives. Resources for such purposes are invariably scarce relative to the number and
magnitude of competing claims, and it is often desirable to target social transfers to those
beneficiaries whose needs are most urgent. Coady and Morley (2003) survey experience with
such targeted transfer programs and show that it is difficult to avoid errors of inclusion and
exclusion. Improved targeting of public spending generally involves reducing either one, or
sometimes both, of these types of errors.
Governments often exploit geographic variability in the design of targeting schemes:
poverty may be more concentrated in some areas of a country than others and most countries
have an administrative structure that operates at the sub-national level. Resources aimed at
poverty reduction can thus be directed to those localities where poverty is concentrated and
administration of these transfer schemes can be carried out at the relevant local level. Despite
their intuitive appeal, however, transfer schemes targeting poor communities remain difficult
to design. Data on incomes or consumption expenditures tend to derive from sample surveys
that are not large enough in size to permit estimates of poverty at a highly disaggregated
level. Absent detailed information on local-level poverty, policymakers have often sought to
use proxies. When such indicators are used for targeting rather than direct estimates of
poverty, there is mis-targeting both due to the targeting errors noted above and due to
problems with the proxy welfare index at the community level.1 Partly as a response to such
mis-targeting of resources, recent years have seen growing experience with the development
of “poverty maps” that combine household survey with population census data to impute
income or consumption to each household in the census.2 The resulting household-level
estimates can then be aggregated into welfare indices at different levels of geographic
aggregation, and have been found to yield fairly precise estimates of welfare at the local
level.
This paper asks how much the higher degree of spatial disaggregation offered by poverty
maps can help to improve targeting schemes aimed at reducing poverty. The paper builds on
the earlier analysis in Ravallion (1993) who finds that geographic targeting at the broad
regional level in Indonesia – the lowest level at which household survey data provide
reliable estimates of poverty – improves targeting, but only to a modest extent. As in
Ravallion (1993), we consider the distribution of a hypothetical budget to a country's
population. We assume that we have no information about the poverty status of this
population other than the geographic location of residence and the level of poverty in each
location.3 As a benchmark case, we make the extreme assumption of no knowledge
whatsoever about the spatial distribution of poverty – in which case our given budget is
distributed uniformly to the entire population. We set up a series of comparisons to this
benchmark, where we assume knowledge about poverty levels in progressively smaller sub-
populations. For a given level of disaggregation, we ask how knowledge of poverty levels
1 For further discussion of the latter problem, see Hentschel et al. (2000).
2 See Elbers et al. (2002, 2003) and Demombynes et al. (2002).
3 In this paper, as in preceding papers by Kanbur (1987) and Ravallion (1993), geographic targeting means cash
transfers to every individual must be equal within the targeted area, but can differ across such localities.
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across localities can help design transfer schemes to improve the overall targeting
performance relative to the benchmark case.
We consider two transfer schemes that make use of this knowledge in different ways: a very
simple and intuitive transfer scheme and an optimal scheme, where expected poverty at the
national level is minimized subject to the available information and budget constraint. We
compare performance across these schemes and consider their relative performance at alternative
levels of disaggregation. Finally, we ask how close “optimal geographic targeting” comes to the
hypothetical scenario of “perfect targeting” to get a sense of the potential benefits from combining
detailed geographic targeting with additional targeting mechanisms such as means-testing or self-
selection within communities.
Our simulations use poverty maps for three countries: Ecuador, Madagascar and Cambodia.
These countries are highly heterogeneous in terms of their geographic location, social and
political structures, and stages of overall development. A key objective of the paper is to
ascertain to what extent availability of local-level poverty data is beneficial in these very
different settings.
We find that there are potentially large gains in targeting performance from disaggregating
to the local level. In all three countries examined, significant benefits from geographic
targeting become increasingly evident as one makes use of more and more disaggregated data
on poverty. For example, in Cambodia, the poverty reduction that can be achieved with a
uniform transfer to everyone can be achieved with 55% of the total budget if the six provinces
of Cambodia are targeted, but with only 31% of those same funds if the targeting is at the
level of the country's 1594 communes. When the targeting scheme makes only crude use of
local level poverty estimates, we find that the gains are generally more muted, but even then,
they can be significant. However, in all countries, we find that overall targeting performance
remains far from perfect. This implies that there may be scope for combining geographic
targeting with other targeting methods in order to reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion
even further.
In the next section, we briefly summarize the methodology and data underpinning the poverty
map estimates in Ecuador, Madagascar and Cambodia. We emphasize that these spatially
disaggregated data are estimates, with confidence bounds, rather than actual measures of poverty.
Section 3 describes the different targeting schemes that are assessed in the simulation stage, and
characterizes how one such scheme can be designated as optimal in the sense of ensuring the
maximum possible gains from geographic targeting subject to a budget constraint. Section 4
describes the simulation procedures and presents results. Section 5 provides a concluding
discussion.
2. Producing local estimates of poverty
We employ a methodology for producing local-level estimates of poverty that has been
described in detail in Elbers et al. (2002, 2003). Let W be a welfare indicator based on the
distribution of a household level variable of interest, yh. Using a detailed household survey
sample, we estimate the joint distribution of yh and observed correlates xh. By restricting the
explanatory variables to those that are also observed at the household level in the population
census, parameter estimates from this “first stage” model can be used to generate the
distribution of yh for any target population in the census conditional on its observed
characteristics and, in turn, the conditional distribution of W. Elbers et al. (2002, 2003) study
the precision of the resulting estimates of W and demonstrate that prediction errors will fall (or
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at least not rise) with the number of households in the target population, and will also be
affected by the properties of the first stage models, in particular the precision of parameter
estimates.4
The first-stage estimation is carried out using household survey data.5 The empirical
models of household consumption allow for an intra-cluster correlation in the disturbances (see
Elbers et al., 2002, 2003 for more details). Failing to take account of spatial correlation in the
disturbances would result in underestimated standard errors in the final poverty estimates.
Different models are estimated for each region and the specifications include census mean
variables and other aggregate level variables in order to capture latent cluster-level effects. All
regressions are estimated with weights and with parsimonious specifications to be cautious
about overfitting. Heteroskedasticity is also modeled in the household-specific part of the
residual.
Simulation methods are applied to predict per-capita expenditure at the level of each
household in the population census. Predicted household-level per-capita consumption in the
census takes into account not only the parameter estimates from the first stage consumption
models estimated in the survey, but also of the precision of these estimates and of those
parameters describing the disturbance terms in the consumption models. Thus, we do not
produce just one predicted consumption level per household in the census, but rather, r
predicted expenditures are simulated for each household (in our three countries, we carry
out 100 replications). For each respective r, parameter estimates are drawn from a
multivariate normal distribution that respects the variance–covariance matrices estimated in
the survey-based consumption and heteroskedasticity regressions. In addition, disturbance
terms at the cluster and household level are drawn from their respective (parametric or semi-
parametric) distributions. These draws are then applied to the census-level regressors and
per-capita consumption is predicted. For the next r, a new set of parameters and
disturbances are drawn and a new per-capita consumption measure is predicted. The
resulting database of r predicted expenditures for every single household in the population
census is the key database underpinning “poverty maps” and the policy-simulation exercise
explored here.6
The data used in this study consists of a household survey and a population census from each
of Ecuador, Madagascar, and Cambodia. Table 1 presents the basics on each of the data sources,
such as year, sample size, stratification, etc. More detail on each country's data sources, and on
the specific procedures followed to produce their “poverty maps” can be found in the studies
listed in Table 1.
4 The relationship between precision of the poverty map estimates and the size of the community is influenced to a
large extent by the explanatory power of the ‘first stage’ regression models that underpins the idiosyncratic error
associated with the poverty estimates. Experience in a variety of countries has shown that when R2 values are around 0.6
or higher, that component of the overall error that varies with size of target population is effectively negligible when
dealing with communities of 1000 households or more. With lower explanatory power, the minimum size of the target
population in the census needs to be larger (see Elbers et al., 2002, 2003).
5 These surveys are stratified at the region or state level, as well as for rural and urban areas. Within each region, there
are further levels of stratification, and also clustering. At the final level, a small number of households (a cluster) are
randomly selected from a census enumeration area.
6 The poverty map estimate of poverty in community, province or region c is produced from this database in the
following manner: for every replication r, poverty is estimated over all households in c (after weighting by household
size). The average of all poverty estimates, over the r replications, yields the estimated poverty rate in community c, and
the standard deviation yields the associated estimated standard error.
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3. Transfer schemes
As described in Section 1, our main objective in this paper is to see to what extent the
availability of poverty estimates for different geographic locations can help to reduce poverty for
a given, exogenous, budget. We postulate that the government has a budget, S, available for
Table 1
Data summary
Ecuador Madagascar Cambodia
Household survey
Year 1994 1993–1994 1997
Source Encuesta de Condiciones
de Vida (ECV)
Enquête Permanente
Auprès des Ménages
(EPM)
Cambodia
Socio-Economic
Survey (CSES)
Sample Size 4500 households 4508 households 6010
Population census
Year 1990 1993 1998
Coverage About 10million individuals
in 2million households
About 11.9million
individuals in 2.4million
households
About 11.0million
individuals in
2.15million households
Geographic units of
Analysis
1st administrative
level
Name Provincia Faritany Province
Number
of localities
21 6 24
Average number
of households
45783 405072 88773
Average number
of persons
223026 1981848 458071
2nd administrative
level
Name Canton Fivandrona District
Number of
localities
195 111 180
Average number
of households
4930 21896 11836
Average number
of persons
24018 107127 61076
3rd administrative
level
Name Parroquia Firaisana Commune
Number
of localities
915 1248 1594
Average number
of households
1051 1933 1337
Average number
of persons
5119 9404 6897
References Hentschel and Lanjouw
(1996); Hentschel et al.
(2000), Elbers et al.
(2002, 2003).
Mistiaen et al. (2002) Fujii (2006)
202 C. Elbers et al. / Journal of Development Economics 83 (2007) 198–213
distribution and wishes to transfer this budget in such a way as to reduce poverty. The government
can vary the amounts transferred to localities around the country, but it cannot transfer different
amounts to different individuals within a community. We specify a baseline case in which the
government is assumed to have no knowledge of who the poor are or where they are located. It is
therefore unable to distribute its budget in any manner other than a lump-sum transfer to the entire
population of size N. We thus calculate the impact of transferring S/N to the entire population.7
Optimal use of geographically disaggregated information on poverty has been investigated by
Kanbur (1987), Ravallion and Chao (1988), Glewwe (1992), Ravallion (1993), and Baker and
Grosh (1994). Kanbur (1987) formalized the theoretical problem of policy design under imperfect
information, while Ravallion and Chao (1988) demonstrated how this general targeting problem
can be solved in a computationally feasible way.8 Kanbur (1987) shows that to minimize poverty
summarized by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty measures with parameter
value α>1, the group with the higher FGT(α−1) should be targeted on the margin.9 Hence, to
minimize the squared poverty gap (equal to a poverty measure from the FGT class with α=2),
target populations should be ranked by the poverty gap (FGT with α=1) and lump-sum transfers
made until the poverty gap of the poorest locality becomes equal to that in the next poorest one,
and so on, until the budget is exhausted.10
The second targeting scheme that we compare against our benchmark case assumes the same
knowledge of the spatial distribution of poverty, but does not make use of this knowledge in any
particularly scientific or systematic way. This “naïve” targeting scheme was selected in order to
contrast with the “optimal” scheme described above. Implementation of an “optimal” scheme
might be difficult in practice. Governments often need to be able to communicate in a very clear
and simple way how resources will be targeted, and this may preclude the fine-tuning needed for
an optimal scheme. Our naïve scheme attempts to assess how detailed geographic targeting
improves efficiency conditional on the types of constraints that governments may typically face in
practice.
Our “naïve” scheme takes the following form.11 We first rank geographic areas by their
estimated poverty gap squared measures. We have an ex ante assessment of overall poverty in the
7 It could be argued that our benchmark scenario is not terribly realistic. Perhaps more likely would be a situation where
absence of detailed information on the extent and distribution of poverty, and absent any specific effort to target the poor,
would result in a default situation of resources being appropriated by the non-poor (see the discussion in Campante and
Ferreira, 2004). To the extent that this is true our estimates of the gains from targeting, once we assume some information
on the distribution of poverty, might be seen as conservative estimates of the true benefits.
8 As we use predicted expenditures from census data unlike Ravallion and Chao (1988), who use observed income data
from household surveys, we utilize a different algorithm to solve the optimization problem. Applying their algorithm to
our setting would yield the same results.
9 Following Foster et al. (1984) the FGT class of poverty measures take the following form:
FGT að Þ ¼ 1P
wi
 X
wið1−ðxi=zÞÞa
where xi is per capita expenditure for those individuals with weight wi who are below the poverty line and zero for those
above, z is the poverty line and ∑wi is total population size. α takes a value of 0 for the Headcount Index, 1 for the
Poverty Gap and 2 for the Squared Poverty Gap. For further discussion, see Ravallion (1994).
10 Elbers et al. (2004) provide a formal statement of this result.
11 Of course, virtually an infinite number of “naïve” schemes could be implemented. We explore here one, particularly
straightforward, example. Experimentation with alternative schemes has not yielded any that is obviously more effective.
Indeed, the specific scheme implemented here has the virtue of not only being simple, but also surprisingly effective
given the budget and poverty line used in this paper. See Elbers et al. (2004) for more detail.
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country. We take our budget S and divide it by the total number of poor persons in the
country, Np. Our budget divided by the total number of poor persons yields the transfer a that
will be distributed to each person. We select the poorest geographic area and transfer a to all
persons in that area. If the budget has not been exhausted in the first region, we move to the
next poorest region and transfer a to all persons in this second region. We continue until the
budget is exhausted. In the marginal region – that in which the budget is exhausted – we do
not transfer a, but transfer an equal share of whatever remains in the budget to the population
of that last region. Note that this scheme does not guarantee some amount of transfer to all
regions. The scheme also implies that households will be receiving differing amounts
according to their overall size.12
3.1. Budget and poverty line13
We assume that the budget available for distribution has been exogenously set. As is
intuitively clear, the potential benefits from targeting will vary with the overall size of budget.
In the limit, as the budget goes to infinity, there is no need for targeting, as even a uniform
transfer will eliminate poverty. In each of the three countries examined here, we identify the
per-capita consumption value of the 25th percentile of the consumption distribution.14 We
scale this consumption value by the total population. Our benchmark budget is set to equal 5%
of this total value.15
Gains from targeting also vary with the choice of poverty line. The higher the poverty
line, the less need for targeting, as leakage to the non-poor diminishes to zero in the limit.
In this study, we select as benchmark a conservative poverty line, that line which yields a
20% headcount rate in each of our three countries.16 We focus on the squared poverty gap
– a measure of poverty that is particularly sensitive to the distance between a poor
12 We experimented also with a “constrained” optimal scheme that combined simplicity with a limited degree of
optimization. In this scheme, a uniform benefit is offered in all areas that the scheme operates in and no benefits are
provided elsewhere. The optimal list of areas is then solved for, conditional on the benefit being the same everywhere.
This scheme resembles the naïve scheme described above, but the benefit size allocated is also optimal, rather than
determined arbitrarily. Unsurprisingly we find that this scheme performs a bit better than our naïve scheme, but the
improvement is only slight, and it comes at a cost of being somewhat more complicated to explain. We are grateful to a
referee for this suggestion.
13 We have tried other poverty lines and budget sizes than the ones described in this sub-section, but for reasons of
brevity we do not present them here. In a companion paper, Elbers et al. (2004) we provide results for a wider set of
poverty lines and budgets. For a formal discussion of using “program dominance curves” to assess the poverty impact of
different programs, see Duclos et al. (2003).
14 The consumption distribution is constructed based on the average, across r replications, of household-level predicted
per-capita consumption in the population census.
15 See Elbers et al. (2004) for additional simulation results based on a budget equal to 10% of this value. This analysis
confirms the Ravallion (1993) finding that as the available budget increases, the incremental gain from geographic
targeting over uniform transfers is attenuated.
16 Within each replication r, the predicted per-capita consumption level associated with a 20% headcount rate is
identified. The average across the r replications of this predicted consumption level is then taken as poverty line. It is
clear that this poverty line will not necessarily yield a 20% headcount rate within each replication, nor would it yield such
a rate for average per capita consumption at the household level (averaging across r replications). Elbers et al. (2004)
repeat simulations also for a poverty line yielding an overall poverty rate of 40% and show that as the poverty line
increases, the gains from spatial disaggregation and geographic targeting become less marked.
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person's income level and the poverty line.17 Note that although our analysis is undertaken
based on the squared poverty gap, a similar approach could also have used some more
conventional measure of social welfare; one that does allow incomes above the poverty line to
also receive some positive social weight. We have found that the broad conclusions from our
analysis are not affected by such a change in set-up.
4. Simulation procedures and results
4.1. Simulating the impact of uniform transfers
Our policy simulation in the case of uniform transfers is calculated in a very straightforward
manner. Budget S is divided by total population N. The resulting transfer a is added to each
predicted expenditure in our database, to yield ych
(r) +a. For each replication r we estimate post-
transfer national poverty. The average across the r replications of the estimated post-transfer
poverty rates yields our expected poverty rate associated with the benchmark, untargeted lump-
sum transfer scheme. This new estimated poverty rate can be compared to the original national-
level poverty estimate from the poverty map to gauge the impact of the transfer.
4.2. Simulating the impact of “optimal” geographic targeting
Simulating the impact of the “optimal” targeting scheme is a bit more complicated. Following
Kanbur (1987), we want to equalize the following expression across the poorest locations of a
country:
GcðacÞ ¼
Z z
0
ðz−y−acÞþdFcðyÞ; ð1Þ
which is z times the poverty gap in location c, after every person in the location has received a
transfer ac. Fc(y) is the average of the R simulated expenditure distributions of c. The function (x)
+
gives the ‘positive part’ of its argument, i.e. (x)+ =x, if x is positive, otherwise 0. Transfers ac
(which must be nonnegative) add up to a given budget S:
X
c
Ncac ¼ S; ð2Þ
where Nc is the population size of location c. After transfers there is a group of locations all
sharing the same (maximum) poverty gap rate in the country. These are the only locations
receiving transfers. We describe in the Appendix how this problem is solved given that we are
working with a database of incomes for every household in the population census in each of our
three countries.
Table 2 presents the results from our simulations with the optimal targeting scheme in Ecuador,
Madagascar and Cambodia. This table depicts how much “cheaper” a given level of poverty
17 We focus on the squared poverty gap because of its appealing properties from both a conceptual and technical point of
view. The basic approach explored here would also work for other poverty measures, particularly FGT measures with
values of parameter α greater than 1. However, with the headcount measure (the FGT measure with α=0) welfare
‘optimization’ is not well defined and the approach taken here is thus less obviously applicable (see for example Ray,
1998, pp. 254–255).
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reduction can be attained with optimal geographic targeting as opposed to no targeting. We apply
a variant of the simulation procedures described above, whereby we calculate how much smaller
the overall budget S could be in order to achieve the same poverty impact with optimal targeting
as with the untargeted uniform lump-sum transfer. In all three countries, our calculations indicate
large savings from optimal geographic targeting. In Ecuador, the gains from targeting at the local
level are large but somewhat more muted than in Madagascar and Cambodia, most likely because
our focus is only on rural areas, and as a result finer disaggregation does not lead to separating
urban districts from rural ones. In Madagascar, and Cambodia the savings are particularly
striking. For example, in these two countries one would need, respectively, only 38% and 31% of
the uniform transfer budget to achieve the same reduction in the FGT2 with optimal targeting at
the firaisana and commune-level.
4.3. Simulating the impact of “naïve” geographic targeting
The optimization scheme described above is intuitively straightforward. But the process
behind the decision as to the exact amount each community will receive is not always easy to
describe. Given that the design and implementation of targeting schemes is often part of a
political process, and that there is generally a need to be able to explain allocations in a simple
and clear manner, it is of some interest to ask whether gains from spatially disaggregated
geographic targeting are also significant when the poverty map is used to implement simpler,
non-optimal, transfer schemes.18
To simulate the impact of the “naïve” transfer scheme we start by taking our poverty map
as the basic statement on the distribution of poverty in the country. Based on the poverty map
we identify the localities that will receive priority in the targeting scheme (we consider
initially regions, then provinces, then communities, etc.). We calculate the amount a that will
be targeted to all persons in the priority regions (budget S divided by the total number of poor
people in the country, Np). We simulate the targeting scheme in turn for each replication r by
allocating a to all persons in our priority regions (irrespective of whether, in replication r,
Table 2
Cost of reducing poverty to the same level achieved by uniform transfers using the “optimal” targeting scheme
Ecuador (rural) Madagascar
(urban and rural)
Cambodia
(urban and rural)
Uniform transfer 100 100 100
Optimal targeting (1st administrative level) 76.0 60.7 54.5
Optimal targeting (2nd administrative level) 66.7 46.4 41.4
Optimal targeting (3rd administrative level) 58.4 37.6 30.8
See Table 1 for details on the number and average size of the administrative units in each country. We use poverty gap
squared (FGT2) as our measure of poverty. In each country, we first distribute the fixed, exogenous budget uniformly
across the entire population and calculate the post-transfer FGT2. Then, we calculate howmuch it would cost to achieve the
same reduction in poverty if we distributed the funds optimally across geographic units. Each cell reports this amount as a
percentage of the total budget available for that country.
18 Optimal geographic transfers also allocate different amounts to different communities, something a government may
find hard to implement, either for administrative difficulties or political reasons. Simpler schemes that allocate a uniform
or a per-capita amount to eligible units may be more palatable under such circumstances.
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those regions are particularly poor or not) until the budget is exhausted. We re-calculate the
post-transfer national poverty rate in replication r. The average post-transfer national poverty
rate across all replications provides our estimate of how poverty will have changed as a result
of the transfer scheme. This expected poverty rate can then be compared to the pre-transfer
estimate of national poverty, to the estimate of post-transfer poverty associated with the
untargeted lump-sum transfer, and to that after the optimal transfer. Table 3 presents these
results.19
It is striking that in all three countries, the reduction in the FGT2 achievable with a naïve
scheme, applied at the most disaggregated level possible in the poverty map, is sizeable. Broadly,
the reduction in the FGT2 based on this scheme is similar to the impact with the optimal scheme at
one level of aggregation higher. For example, in Ecuador, targeting at the 3rd administrative-level
using our naïve scheme yields an estimated FGT2 that is 63.6% the value of the pre-transfer FGT2,
roughly the same as the 63.2% attainable with optimal targeting at the 2nd administrative-level.
Similarly, in Madagascar and Cambodia, 3rd administrative-level targeting with the naïve scheme
yields national FGT2 estimates, each of which is approximately half as high as the respective pre-
transfer poverty rate, remarkably comparable to the figures using optimal targeting at the 2nd
administrative-level in each country.
Elbers et al. (2004) show that the relative performance of our “naïve” scheme varies
significantly when a higher budget or a higher poverty line is used. Indeed, there are cases where
giving every individual the same amount of money would have a higher impact on poverty
reduction than using the naïve scheme described here. It is also difficult to know in advance how
other similar, non-optimal, targeting schemes would perform in a certain country. The point to
emphasize is that poverty maps of the kind developed here can be utilized to devise targeting
schemes that are intuitive and transparent, and that perform nearly as well as the optimal
geographic targeting scheme.
19 Elbers et al. (2004) assess the statistical precision of comparisons of poverty across scenarios. The statistical
significance of poverty differences is ascertained by returning to the transfer simulations and estimating not FGT2 values,
but rather the difference in the estimated FGT2 based on a specific targeting scheme at the 3rd administrative level vis-à-
vis targeting at the uniform, 1st and 2nd administrative levels using the same targeting scheme. In all cases, these
differences are strongly statistically significant.
Table 3
Impact of cash transfers to different administrative levels on poverty reduction using the “optimal” vs. the “naïve” targeting
schemes
Ecuador (rural) Madagascar (urban
and rural)
Cambodia (urban
and rural)
Optimal Naïve Optimal Naïve Optimal Naïve
Pre-transfer FGT2 100 100 100 100 100 100
Post-uniform transfer FGT2 71.4 71.4 70.3 70.3 73.7 73.7
Post-targeting FGT2 (1st administrative level) 65.7 71.8 57.0 63.7 57.9 63.2
Post-targeting FGT2 (2nd administrative level) 63.2 67.1 51.1 54.8 52.6 57.9
Post-targeting FGT2 (3rd administrative level) 59.6 63.6 46.7 50.0 47.4 52.6
See Table 1 for details on the number and average size of the administrative units in each country. We use poverty gap
squared (FGT2) as our measure of poverty. In each country, the FGT2 has been normalized to 100 for easy comparison of
our results across countries.
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4.4. Distance from perfect targeting
As has been emphasized in Section 2, the poverty map cannot provide reasonably precise
estimates of poverty below some level of aggregation.20 It remains of interest, however, to ask
how much of a further reduction in poverty could be expected if policymakers could actually
target individual households perfectly.21 We can compare optimal geographic targeting to
household level targeting by noting that the budget required to eliminate poverty under the
assumption of perfect targeting (i.e. it is possible to observe the precise welfare level of every
household and to tailor the transfer received by each household perfectly) is provided by the
poverty gap (FGT1) weighted by the poverty line and the total population. Thus, we can calculate
from our poverty mapping database the hypothetical cost of eliminating poverty if it were possible
to target the poor perfectly (and there were no behavioral responses). We can then take this budget
and target it, instead, geographically, at the lowest level of geographic disaggregation that we feel
that the poverty map can support. How far are we from having eliminated poverty when our
transfer occurs at this geographic level rather than having been tailored to the precise
circumstances of each poor household? In rural Ecuador, optimal parroquia-level geographic
targeting of this budget reduces the FGT2 by only 37% points. Table 4 presents the results for
Cambodia. Similar results obtain in Madagascar.
Why does optimal geographic targeting based on our detailed poverty maps fall so far short
of the ideal? In a companion paper, Elbers et al. (2004) analyze evidence on the variation of
inequality levels within poor communities. They show that in three countries, including two of
the countries examined here (Ecuador and Madagascar), within-community inequality varies
widely across communities. Some communities exhibit levels of inequality as high, or higher,
than overall inequality at the national level, while others are significantly more equal. An
important conclusion from this study is that there should be no presumption of lower levels of
inequality in poor communities. In fact, in the three countries examined in the above-
mentioned study, median inequality is highest amongst the bottom quintile of communities
20 By ‘reasonably precise’ estimates, we mean ratios of standard error to point estimate that are similar to those that
would be obtained from the household survey at the stratum level. As we will see in the next section, this does not imply
that there is no useful information contained in poverty estimates for groups smaller than villages, such as neighborhoods
or even households. It does mean, however, that one's ability to draw meaningful inferences declines rapidly as the unit
of observation becomes smaller than, say, a village.
21 One could alternatively ask how much of a further benefit could one expect if, rather than being providing lump-sum
transfers to poor communities, policymakers were able to combine geographic targeting with, say, means testing within
poor communities.
Table 4
Distance between “optimal” targeting and “perfect” targeting in Cambodia
FGT2 (⁎100) % Spent on non-poor % Reduction in FGT2
Budget=total poverty gap associated with 20% overall poverty rate
Level of targeting
Pre-transfer 1.93
Lump-sum transfer 1.47 81.2 23.9
Province⁎Urban/Rural (44) 1.23 71.2 36.4
District (180) 1.12 67.0 41.9
Commune (1594) 0.99 62.5 48.7
Household (2130544) 0.00 0.00 100.0
The numbers in parentheses reflect the number of units targeted.
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(ranked either in terms of average per-capita consumption or headcount rate of poverty) and
this quintile also displays the highest degree of variation of inequality levels across
communities. The implication of this finding is that within very poor communities, even small
ones with populations of 5000households or less, there are likely to be both poor and non-
poor households. Community level targeting that transfers a uniform amount to all individuals
within these small communities is thus likely to continue to suffer from significant leakage.
The poverty impact of such targeting will thus fall short of what would have been possible if
perfect targeting were available.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we have used “Poverty Maps” produced in Ecuador, Madagascar and Cambodia
to simulate the impact on poverty reduction of transferring an exogenously given budget to
geographically defined sub-groups of the population according to their relative poverty status. We
have asked to what extent effectiveness of targeting in reducing poverty improves as we define
these sub-groups at progressively lower levels of spatial disaggregation.
We have found significant gains from targeting smaller administrative units, such as districts or
villages. These gains are large and surprisingly similar in three countries at different stages of
development, and with entirely different distributions of welfare. We have shown that the benefits
from targeting are particularly clearly discerned when expressed in terms of budgetary savings of
achieving a given rate of poverty reduction.
Our assessment of targeting performance has been based on an optimal use of estimates
from poverty maps. There might be grounds for concern that the design of transfer schemes
based on such optimized routines suffers from lack of transparency and would be difficult to
describe in simple terms. Governments may consequently not be able to put such schemes into
practice. We have considered, therefore, an alternative transfer scheme, based on a simpler,
non-optimal use of the poverty map. We have found that while this particular “naïve” scheme
does not achieve the same success in our three countries as the optimal targeting scheme, its
performance remains surprisingly good given the budget and poverty line employed in this
paper. On the other hand, as shown in Elbers et al. (2004), when the budget or the poverty
line is higher, the same targeting scheme we implemented can perform worse than even a
uniform transfer to individuals.
The fact that some non-optimal schemes can perform very well under certain circumstances,
while others can actually do worse than no targeting in different circumstances points to a useful
policy application of the methodology presented here. Given access to similar data for her
country, a policy-maker can first evaluate the reduction in poverty using optimal geographic
targeting for a given budget. Then, taking into account the political and administrative constraints
she faces, she can devise various other transfer schemes that are clear and transparent and choose
one that performs reasonably close to optimal targeting (or choose optimal targeting itself, if that
is feasible). Hence, such detailed data on poverty can be used as an ex ante evaluation tool for
designing a cash transfer scheme that is efficient and realistic.
There are, however, important caveats that attach to these findings. First, we assume that
the government is willing to accept that households with equal pre-transfer per-capita
consumption levels might enjoy different post-transfer consumption levels.22 Second, we
22 This is because two households with the same per capita consumption who live in different communities can receive
different transfer amounts under geographic targeting schemes, violating the principle of ‘horizontal equity’.
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assume that the budget available for distribution is exogenously determined. We abstract
away entirely from the question of how the transfers are to be financed. Political economy
considerations could influence options for resource mobilization (see for example, Gelbach
and Pritchett, 2002). Third, we do not address the very real possibility that the costs of
administering a given transfer scheme at the village level may be much higher than at the
level of, say, district or province. Fourth, we do not allow for behavioral responses in the
population. Finally, we do not address the possibility that inequalities in power and
influence that prevail in a community may influence how transfers are allocated. Such
factors could result in an overestimation of the impact of the targeting scheme on poverty
reduction.23
The results in this paper should thus be viewed as illustrative only. The gains from targeting
should be juxtaposed against the potential costs and political-economy considerations. In
practice, a combination of geographic targeting across villages and some targeting within villages
(means-tested or decentralized) may be a more attractive solution. Policymakers need to assess
such programs on a case-by-case basis to determine whether fine-geographic targeting is the
appropriate strategy.
To conclude, how useful are poverty maps for the purpose of designing geographically
targeted poverty alleviation schemes? Our analysis indicates that, in addition to the factors
already discussed above, the utility of poverty maps will hinge on two key issues. First is the
question of whether the poverty map is able to convincingly distinguish between localities in
terms of poverty. This will hinge on the statistical precision of the poverty estimates, which in
turn will be largely driven by the accuracy and explanatory power of the consumption models
estimated using the household survey data. In the extreme case, if a first stage model had no
predictive power (an extremely low R2) the resulting community level estimates of poverty
from the census would all be approximately the same, and confidence intervals around those
estimates would be so large as to make it impossible to reject equality of poverty rates across
all communities. There would be no gains from geographic targeting over a simple uniform
transfer of the available budget.
The second issue concerns the real distribution of wellbeing in a country. Even if estimates of
poverty at the community level are fairly precise, as we found them to be in the three countries
considered here, simple geographic targeting of resources to communities may not be particularly
helpful if variation in living standards within communities is pronounced. Geographic targeting
will be most effective if the poverty maps reveal both great variation in poverty levels across
communities and low levels of inequality in the poorest communities.
One issue that we have not pursued in this paper is the related question of whether poverty
maps could be used to target households directly. We have emphasized that household-level
estimates of poverty, derived based on our methodology, are very imprecise. One might thus
expect that household-level targeting using such estimates would yield expected post-transfer
poverty rates with very wide confidence intervals, implying considerable risk that the transfer
would yield little gains in poverty reduction, but large increases in cost (administrative and
23 On the other hand, it is also possible that the infusion of transfers into a poor community could increase risk-sharing
in that community and thereby contribute to further reductions in poverty. Moreover, Dasgupta and Kanbur (2003) shows
that basic results of the targeting literature can change in the presence of community-specific public goods, and that
optimal targeting for poverty alleviation can lead to paradoxical results for certain values of the poverty aversion
parameter, for example that targeting transfers to the richer community can result in greater welfare gains for the poor (via
the increased provision of public goods by the richer segments).
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political). However, even highly imprecise household level poverty estimates can still convey
some useful information. Indeed, preliminary calculations using the same data employed here
suggest that household-level targeting could not only yield significant reductions in expected
poverty, but that these gains would be statistically significant.
However, before using this finding to call for a shift from geographic targeting of resources
to communities, to the targeting of those resources to individual households, one should
acknowledge that there are a whole host of additional issues which come to the fore. These
issues extend well beyond statistical considerations. For example, targeting individual
households is likely to have quite a different, and generally more pronounced, effect on
incentives and household behavior. Implementation of a national targeting scheme to
individual households may also be much more difficult to administer than a community-level
approach. And there are also ethical concerns that are associated with the fact that average
gains in expected poverty reduction would come with large targeting errors at the household
level. After all, an empirical study documenting that a particular health treatment would lead,
on average, to society-wide improvements in health status does not necessarily provide
adequate justification for doctors to prescribe that specific treatment to individual patients. The
cost of misdiagnosis at the level of the patient might be prohibitively high. An assessment of
the merits of household-level targeting against community level targeting requires a broader
perspective than what has been possible in this paper. But it is an important subject for future
research.
Appendix A. Simulating the impact of “optimal” geographic targeting
As described in the text, given our interest to minimize the FGT2, optimal geographic targeting
implies that after transfers there is a group of locations all sharing the same (maximum) poverty
gap in the country. We determine the level of transfers going to each location by first solving a
different problem. Following the notation introduced in Section 4 consider the minimum budget S
(G) needed to bring down all locations' poverty gaps to at most the level G/z. This amounts to
transferring an amount ac(G) to locations with before-transfer poverty gaps above G/z, such that
Gc(ac(G))=G. Once we know how to compute S(G), we simply adjust G until S(G) equals the
originally given budget for transfers S. To implement this scheme we must solve the following
equation for ac:
G ¼
Z z
0
ðz−y−acÞþdFcðyÞ: ðA:1Þ
In what follows we drop the location index c for ease of notation. Using integration by parts, it can
be shown that
GðaÞ ¼
Z z
0
ðz−y−aÞþdFðyÞ ¼
Z z−a
0
FðyÞdy: ðA:2Þ
In other words we need to compute the surface under the expenditure distribution between
expenditure levels y=0 and y= z− t, for values of t up to z. Instead of computing G(t) exactly, we
use a simple approximation. For this to work, we split the interval [0,z] in n equal segments and
assume that the ‘poverty mapping’ software has generated expected headcounts for poverty lines
zk/n, where k=0, …, n. In other words we have a table of F(zk/n). Using the table we approximate
F(y) by linear interpolation for y between table values. With the approximated expenditure
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distribution, it is easy to solve for transfers as a function of G (see below). In practice, we find that
n=20 gives sufficiently precise results.24
The computational set-up is as follows (note that the numbering we adopt means going from z
in the direction of 0 rather than the other way around). Define b0=0, and for k=1,…, n, bk as the
surface under the (approximated) expenditure distribution between z−kz/n and z− (k−1)z/n,
divided by z:
bk ¼ 12n ðFðz−kz=nÞ þ Fðz−ðk−1Þz=nÞÞ: ðA:3Þ
Let g0 be the original poverty gap, or in terms of the discussion above, g0=G(0)/z. For k=1, …, n,
put
gk ¼ gk−1−bk : ðA:4Þ
The gk are the poverty gaps of the approximated expenditure distribution for successively lower
poverty lines z−kz/n. Let ak be the per-capita transfer needed to bring down the poverty line to z
−kz/n:
ak ¼ kz=n: ðA:5Þ
We can now solve for per-capita transfers as a function of the intended poverty gap g<g0:
1. Find k such that gk+1≤g<gk.
2. The per-capita transfers resulting in poverty gap g are
a gð Þ ¼ ak þ gk−ggk−gkþ1 d
z
n
: ðA:6Þ
This scheme can be implemented using standard spreadsheet software.
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